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for or authorized the strike or that the key men were absent
because some of the claimants participated in the picketing.
I would, therefore, affirm the judgment.
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied September
25, 1952. Carter, J., was of the opinion that the petition
should be granted.

[S. F. No. 18590.

In Bank.

Aug. 28, 1952.]

LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Petitioner,
v. INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT COMMISSION and
GLENN W. DAHLER, a Minor, Respondents.
[1] Workmen's Compensation-Compensable Injuries-Relation to
Employment.-In determining whether a particular act is
reasonably contemplated by the employment so that injuries
received while performing it may be compensable, the nature
of the employment, the custom and usage of a particular
employment, the terms of the contract of employment, and
other factors should be considered, and any reasonable doubt
as to whether the act is contemplated by the employment, in
view of the policy of liberal construction in favor of the
employee, should be resolved in his favor.
[2a, 2b] !d.-Compensable Injuries-Relation to Employment.-A
college student employed by operator of store and restaurant
at a summer resort as a dishwasher and a helper is not entitled to compensation for injuries sustained while diving and
swimming for his own pleasure in a stream off his employer's
property, although on the resort premises, since in the absence of evidence that, at the time of such student's hiring,
anything was said about his participation in any available
recreational activities or even mention made of the stream,
it cannot be said that the injuries were sustained in the
course of or incidental to his employment, or that they were
proximately caused by the employment.
[3] !d.-Compensable Injuries-Relation to Employment.-To entitle an injured employee to compensation there must be some
connection between the injury and the employment other
[1] See Cal.Jur., Workmen's Compensation,§ 61; Am.Jur., Workmen's Compensation, § 83.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Workmen's Compensation, § 72;
[2] Workmen's Compensation, §§ 73, 74; [3] Workmen's Compensation, § 71; [4] Workmen's Compensation, § 73.
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than the mere fact that the employment brought him to the
place of injury.
[4] !d.-Compensable Injuries-Relation to :Employment.-Mere
fact that employee had permissive use of recreational area
beyond employer's premises does not give rise to blanket
protection under the compensation law, and his swimming
activities in a stream in that area pursued as an off-duty
personal diversion in his free time, being unrelated to the
employment, do not come within the compass of such law.

PROCEEDING to review an order of the Industrial Accident Commission awarding compensation for personal injuries. Award annulled.
Leonard, Hanna & Brophy and Edmund D. Leonard for
Petitioner.
Edmund J. Thomas, Jr., T. Groezinger, Robert Ball, Leonard Levy and Stanley P. Mamalakis for Respondents.
SPENCE, J.-Petitioner seeks to annul an award of the
Industrial Accident Commission in favor of the injured
employee Glenn W. Dahler. It maintains that the injuries
did not arise out of, nor were they incurred in the course
of, the employment, and that therefore they are not compensable under the Workmen's Compensation Act. (Lab.
Code, § 3600, subds. (b), (c).)
There is no dispute as to the facts. The North Fork
Association, a sportsmen's club, owned a large recreational
area in the Sierra. In a portion of this area, it maintained
a summer resort, "The Cedars," for the exclusive use of
its members, their families and guests. Located in the resort area were some 25 cabins owned by the members, as
well as a store and restaurant operated as a concession by
Swafford and Company, the employer here involved.
Dahler, a college student, was hired by Mr. Swafford to
work at the concession during the summer as a dishwasher
and helper. As his duties were discussed at that time, he
would be required to serve breakfast and dinner and to
open and operate the store a couple of hours in the morning.
He was to receive $35 per week, plus room and board. He
began his work at the resort on June 27, 1950. He had no
definite hours of employment but followed a daily routine
established by Swafford when the latter was on the premises
39 C.2d-17
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for a few days to arrange for the concession's opening for
business on .July L Upon this basis Dahler started work
at 7 :30 a. m. cleaning the trays for breakfast, which was
served at 8 a. m. ; then he washed dishes until about 10
a. m.; and from 10 or 10 :30 a. m. until noon he worked in
the store filling orders. He usually ate lunch between 12
and 1 p. m., and then he would return to the work of washing dishes and cleaning the dining room, finishing these
chores between 2 and 3 p. m. Normally he would have no
further work to perform until 5 p. m., when he would begin
drying trays and serving salads for the evening meal, wash
the dinner dishes and then clean the dining room, completing this work about 10 :30 p. Iil. Once each week in the
afternoon when a truck would come with groceries, he would
unload the supplies and stock them in the store after he
finished his dining-room work in the afternoon. Occasionally
in the afternoons he would deliver goods from the store to
the cabins of club members. He also had the duty of delivering telephone messages to the members at their cabins. There
were only three employees regularly stationed at the resort
in connection with the operation of the concession: Dahler,
the cook Robinson, and the cook's wife. Robinson was in
charge and supervised Dahler's work, but the latter's routine
followed the pattern fixed by Swafford.
On the association's property but not on the portion occupied by the concession was a stream with a dam built
across it. The pool, which was created by the dam and was
used for swimming, was some 10 blocks distant from the
restaurant and some 7 or 8 blocks beyond the cabins. Dahler
had not been told that he could or could not go swimming
in the stream but it was just ''more or less taken for granted''
that he could. He had swum there on several occasions, the
first time being on July 3, when he told Swafford that he
was going swimming in the afternoon during his free hours
and Swafford did not object. When he had free time, Dahler
could also have gone fishing or hiking, which were other
recreational activities available in the area. Dahler had
been furnished a cottage immediately adjacent to the store,
which cottage was fitted with all the necessary sanitary facilities so that his swimming in the stream was not necessary
for cleansing purposes.
The injuries in question occurred on July 19. On that
day Dahler finished his early afternoon work about 3 o'clock.
He then went to the dam to swim, as a matter of personal

Aug.1952]

LIBERTY MuT. INs.

Co. v.

IND.

Ace. CoM.

515

[39 C.2d 512; 247 P.2d 6971

pleasure during his free time. He swam, sun-bathed, and
undertook to show a girl how to swim. He then proceeded
to dive into the stream from some rocks some 3 feet above
the water level, when he struck a mudbank beneath the
surface and suffered a severe injury.
On this evidence the commission found that Dahler ''sustained injury arising md of and in the course of the ernploy-

rnent ... while divirng into a pool on the employer's premises," and made its award accordingly. (Emphasis added.)
Respondents concede that the place of injury, the swimmingpool, was not on the employer's premises and therefore that
portion of the finding is erroneous. However, there still remains the question of whether Dahler's injury is compensable as arising out of and in the course of the employment.
[l] Our Workmen's Compensation Act has been broadly
construed to embrace various activities which can, in a reasonable sense, be included within its coverage as incident
to the employment. So it was said in Employer's Liability
Assurance Corp. v. Industrial Ace. Com., 37 Cal.App.2d 567,
at pages 573-574 [99 P.2d 1089]: "If the particular act is
reasonably contemplatrd by the employment, injuries received while performing it arise out of the employment,
and are compensablr. In determining whether a particular
act is reasonably contemplated by the employment the nature
of the act, the nature of the employment, the custom and
usage of a particular employment, the terms of the contract
of employment, and perhaps other factors should be considered. \Any reasonable doubt as to whether the act is
contemplated by the employment, in view of this state's
policy of liberal construction in favor of the employee, should
be resolved in favor of the employee." (Also Pa.cific Indemnity Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com., 26 Cal.2d 509, 514 [159
P.2d 625] ; Bethlehem Steel Co. v. lndust1·1al Ace. Com., 70
Cal.App.2d 382, 387-388 [161 P.2d 59].) But in adhering
to the policy of _liberal construction of the act;~~itnevertlie
less_d.oesl1ot appear possible to stretch its broad purpose
to cover a case such as this.
'[2aT~"Tlie·l;ec6rd inclfsputablyestablishes that Dahler was
injured while diving and swimming solely for his own pleasure
in a stream off his employer's premises and on his free time
during a work interlude in midafternoon. It is true that
the employment may be said to have contemplated that
Dahler would engage in some recreational activity during
his free time if he so chose-whether it be swimming, sun-
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bathing, fishing, hiking or any other recreational pursuit
available in the general area. But that consideration alone
would not constitute every recreational activity chosen by
Dahler a part of his compensation under his contract of
employment nor make the injury compensable as arising out
of and in the course of the employment. There is no evidence that at the time of hiring Dahler, anything was said
about his participation in any available recreational activities nor even mention made of the stream; or that Dahler
after starting his employment, ever discussed with either
Swafford or Robinson, the cook, whether he could or could
not swim in the stream. It does appear that when Dahler
told Swafford and Robinson on different occasions of free
time that he was going to swim in the pool, neither offered
any objection. But neither was in a position to object, for
the pool was located several blocks beyond the cabin and
concession area of the resort where Dahler worked and on
property over which Swafford had no control.
[3] ''There must be some connection between the injury
and the employment other than the mere fact that the employment brought the injured party to the place of injury."
(Califm·nia Casualty Indem. Exchange v. Industrial Ace.
Com., 190 Cal. 433, 436 [213 P. 257] .) [4] The mere fact
that Dahler as Swafford's employee had permissive use of
the recreational area beyond the employer's premises does
not give rise to blanket protection under the compensation
law. Rather, Dahler's swimming activities, unrelated to the
employment, remote from his place of work and its risk, pursued as an off -duty personal diversion in the employee's free
time, in an area beyond the dominion and control of his
employer, and yielding neither advantage nor benefit to the
employer, must be held to have been wholly without the
compass of the compensation law. (Arabian American Oil
Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com., 94 Cal.App.2d 388, 392-393 [210
P.2d 732].)
Clearly distinguishable are the cases cited by respondents
to the effect that employees sustaining injury while engaged
in the performance of personal acts reasonably and necessarily contemplated by the employment come within the
protection of the compensation law. For example of these
cases, see Pacific Indemnity Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com., 26
Cal.2d 509 [159 P.2d 625], where two employees were drowned
in a reservoir on the employer's premises incident to its use
as a washing facility furnished by the employer for cleansing
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purposes after the day's farm labor; and Employers' L'iab,ility Assurance Corp. v. Industrial Ace. Com., supra, 37
CaLt\pp.2d 567 [99 P.2d 1089], where the employee, a household servant, was required to live on the employer's premises,
received her board and room as part of her compensation, and
was on call by her employer at the time of her injury, which
resulted from a fall from a stool on which she was standing
in her own room to see better in the mirror the hem of her
dress which she was attempting to check.
It is true, of course, that there are other instances where
the employee's recreational activity has been held to be so
related to the employment that a resulting injury was deemed
to be one arising out of and in the course of the employment. Such are the cases cited by respondents: E.g. P~usin
ski v. Transit Valley Country Club, 283 N.Y. 674 [28 N.E.
2d 401], where the claimant was injured on the employer's
property, a golf course on which he worked as a caddy, and
it appeared that the game in which he was hurt was a recreational activity supervised by the caddy master as a representative of the employer and encouraged as practice play
for the caddies because it "tended to make them more efficient caddies"; and Dowen v. Saratoga Springs Com. (1944),
267 App.Div. 928 [46 N.Y.S.2d 822], where the claimant, a
locker boy, who was given permission to use a swimming pool
maintained by his employer in connection with its business and
upon the premises where he worked, was hurt during his
recreational hour as the result of a fall from a ladder leading to a diving-board from which he intended to dive into
the pool, and the injury was held compensable upon citation
of the Piusinski case. In such circumstances where the employee was injured on the employer's premises, where he
was making permissive use, as contemplated by the contract
of employment, of the premises and equipment of the employer used in the conduct of its business, and where the
recreational activity was conceivably of some benefit to the
employer, the compensation award was sustained as incidental to the employment.
[2b] In the present case, the only inference which can
reasonably be drawn from the evidence is that Dahler's injury occurred while he was engaged in a personal recreational
activity on his own free time in an area without the orbit
of his employment and beyond the control or dominion of
his employer. Under such circumstances, it cannot be said
that the injury was sustained in the course of or incidental
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to his employment, or that it was proximately caused by the
employment. (Arab1:an American 01:z Co. v. Indttstrial Ace.
Com., supra, 94 Cal.App.2d 388, 393 [210 P.2d 732].) Respondents' theory of compensation rests on the imposition
of liability arising solely from the mere existence of the
employment relationship and permits of no logical limitation,
for carried to its conclusion, it would include any injury
as a compensable claim if it occurred in pursuance of any
recreational activity available in the general area regardless
of connection with the employment. That view of the law
wouid do violence to the express provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act, which require that all compensable
injuries arise out of and in the course of the employment.
(Torrey v. Inclttskial Ace. Com., 132 Cal.App. 303, 306 [22
P.2d 525]; Pacific Inclem. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com., 27
Cal.App.2d 499, 502-503 [81 P.2d 572] ; Arabian American
Oil Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com., supra, 94 Cal.App.2d 388,
392-394 [210 P.2d 732] .)
The award is annulled.
Gibson, C. J., Edmonds, J., Traynor, J., and Schauer, J.,
concurred.
CARTER, J.-I dissent.
The opinion prepared by Mr. Justice Bray of the District
Court of Appeal and concurred in by Mr. Presiding Justice
Peters and Mr. Justice Fred B. Wood of that court, ably
sets forth the facts and applicable law. I adopt it as my
dissent:
''Petition to review an award of the Industrial Accident
Commission. The sole issue is whether the injury arose out
of and was incurred in the course of employment.
FACTS

''There is practically no conflict in the evidence. 'l'he
North Fork Association, comprised of persons enjoying the
great out-of-doors, owns a large area in the Sierra. Approximately 25 cabins are owned by the members and are located
in a portion of the area having a radius equal to about five
city blocks. This area is called 'The Cedars.' In it is located
a store and restaurant operated as a concession by Swafford
and Company. Glenn W. Dahler, a student at the University of California, was 19 years of age. About June 19,
1950, he was employed by Mr. Swafford for Swafford and
Company in San Francisco as a dishwasher and helper.
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About all that was said about his duties at that time was
that he was to serve breakfast and dinner and open and
operate the store a couple of hours in the morning. He was
to receive $35 per week plus room and board. His employment started on the 26th when he went in Swafford's truck
with the Swafford and Company cook and her husband to
The Cedars. They arrived late that night. On the morning
of the 27th, he helped clean the grill (the restaurant) and
apparently worked around it until July 1st when it opened
for business. It was patronized exclusively by the members of the North Fork Association, their guests and the
employees of the members. Mr. Swafford was present the
first two or three days the grill opened. Glenn's duties
started about 8 a. m. when he helped serve breakfast, except
on days when the trays were dirty, when he started at 7 :30
and cleaned the trays. After breakfast he washed dishes.
About 10 or 10 :30 he opened the store and filled orders until
12. If patrons wanted meat he would thaw it out and deliver it in the afternoon. He usually ate lunch between
12 and 1 with the employees of the association. He would
then go back to the dishes, clean the dining room and sweep
the floor, finishing between 2 and 3. About once a week
the truck would come with groceries and he would unload
and pack them away after he finished the dining room. If
meat had been ordered, he would deliver it at this time also.
He would then be free until around 5 when he would get
the trays dried and ready for dinner, serve salads, bus dishes
and wash them. This would take until about 10 :30. Swafford
had g·iven him no definite hours to work. Swafford, however, observed the work that Glenn did. The cook's husband,
Robinson, was in charge and supervised some of Glenn's
duties but Swafford established Glenn's routine. When telephone calls came for members, Glenn would go to their
cabins and notify them to go to the telephone in the amusement hall adjoining the grill.
"On the association property, but not on the portion occupied by the employer's concession, a distance of about
ten blocks from the grill, was a dam where the members,
their guests and their employees and employees of the association swam. Glenn had swum thrre before, the first
time being July 3d. No one had told him he could go swimming there, or that he could not; it was just more or less
taken for granted tJ1at he could. On one occasion when
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Swafford decided not to take inventory, Glenn told him he
would go swimming instead. Swafford did not object. During his work at The Cedars, Glenn left camp only three
times at the most. One night he went with Swafford to
Reno to see the sights, and twice he left camp to get groceries. When he did not have time to go swimming he stayed
around the camp. When he had free time he could have
gone fishing or hiking. On July 19th, Glenn got through
with washing the lunch dishes and getting the dining room
in order for dinner around 3 o'clock. He then went to the
dam to swim, and for no other purpose. He swam, sunbathed, and attempted to show a girl who was a daughter
of a member how to swim. He then dove off around two
and a half to three feet from the steep rocks into the water,
which at that spot was about four feet deep. A girl was
standing about where he dove as he had asked her to do so
as to show the depth. He struck a mudbank or something.
He could not move his body and he was pulled out by the
girl. He received severe damage to his spinal cord.
''On this evidence the referee made a finding that Dahler
'sustained injury arising out of and in the co1tr'se of the
empToyment . . . whiTe diving into a pooT on the employer's
premises.' (Italics added.)
wAS SWIMMING AT THE DAM CONTEMPLATED

IN THE EMPLOYMENT?
"Respondents concede that the place of injury, the pool,
was not on the employer's premises and hence that portion
of the finding is erroneous. This, however, does not end
the case. The question left to be determined is whether
swimming at the dam was reasonably contemplated in the
employment of Glenn, and therefore the injury arose out
of and in the course of that employment. It is apparent from the record that at the time Glenn was hired
by Swafford very little was said about his duties, and
that what he was to do was determined in large part
by what he was told to do by Swafford and Robinson at
the camp, and what all took for granted he did without his
being expressly directed. He· was confined rather closely
to camp and his leisure time was quite restricted. A reasonable inference from all the facts and circumstances is that
it was contemplated as a part of his employment that he
was to receive, besides his pay, room and board, the right
to swim at the dam. This was the recreation he was expected to take as the time element did not permit him any
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form which would take him away from camp. While 'camp'
was generally considered to be the area occupied by the
homes of the members, a reasonable inference from the evidence is that it also included the dam where everyone at
The Cedars went to swim.
''The inferences above mentioned are not compelled by
the circumstances nor are they the only ones that could
be drawn therefrom. However, they are reasonable ones
and under the well known rule, where different inferences
may reasonably be drawn from the facts, we are bound by
the determination thereof by the commission.
AUTHORITIES

"The parties have not cited, nor have we found, any case
where the facts were identical with those in the case at bar.
The nearest case factually is Dowan v. Saratoga Springs Com.
(1944), 267 App.Div. 928 [46 N.Y.S.2d 822]. There, locker
boys, during their lunch hour and after working hours, when
accommodation::; were not crowded, were given permission to
use the swimming pool maintained by the employer in connection with its business and upon the premises where the
boys were employed. One of the boys, during his recreation hour, was climbing a ladder leading to a diving board
from which he intended to dive into the pool. He slipped
and was injured. 'rhe State Industrial Board ruled that
he was entitled to compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Law. The court affirmed the award. There, of
course, the injury occurred on the employer's premises. In
our case it was off his premises. This distinction, however,
is not important. If the recreation facilities are provided
as a part of the employment, it could make no difference
whether they were on or off the employer's premises or were
or were not owned by the employer.
''A case illustrating the principle applied by the commission, although the facts are stronger than in our case, is
Piusinski v. Transit Valley Country Chtb, 283 N.Y. 674
[28 N.E.2d 401]. There the claimant was employed by the
club as a golf caddy. He and the other caddies were encouraged to play golf on the club's course each Monday
under the supervision of a caddy master, not only for their
own amusement, but because the practice tended to make them
more efficient caddies. Claimant was injured while engaged
in such a practice game with the other caddies. The court
supported the finding of the commission that the injury
arose out of and in the course of the employment.
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''While the facts are somewhat different, it is difficult to
distinguish the ruling in Employers' etc. Corp. v. Industrial
Ace. Com., 37 CaLApp.2d 567 [99 P.2d 1089], from that of
the commission here. There the, employee, hired as a cook,
was required to live at her employer's residence, and, as part
of her compensation, received her room and board. On
what was normally her 'day off,' the maid had left, so she
worked until 11 or 11 :30 a. m. She then told her employer
that she would return early that evening to wash the dishes.
A little before 8 p. m. she returned. She put an apron
over her street dress and washed the dishes. She then retired to her room. She was then on call to answer the telephone or the doorbell, and was expecting her employer to
call her to take care of the child. While waiting, she noticed
that her dress was a little long. The mirror was hot adjustable. To observe more clearly the hem of the dress she
stood on a stool. While shortening the dress, she slipped
and fell, sustaining injuries which the commission found
occurred in the course of and arose out of her employment.
After pointing out that where an employee is required to
live on the employer's premises, any injury received while
the employee is making a reasonable ·use of said premises
is in the course of the employment, even though received
during the employee's leisure time, the court states that
the only debatable question is whether the injury could be
said to have arisen out of the employment. It then stated
(p. 570) : "fhe mere fact that the employee was engaged
in performing a personal act when injured does not, per se,
determine that the injury did not arise out of the employment.' It refers to a number of cases in which the employee
was engaged in performing a personal act when injured,
and such act was held to arise out of the employment, such
as Western Pac. R. R. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com., 193 Cal.
413 [224 P. 754], where a messenger was struck by an automobile while returning to his place of employment from his
home where he had gone to get his overcoat; Whiting-Mead
Commercial Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com., 178 Cal. 505 [173
P. 1105, 5 A.L.R. 1518], where an employee had injured
his hand while working for his employer and later, while
lighting a cigarette, set fire to the bandage which had been
soaked in turpentine; Martin v. Lovibond & Sons, 7 B.W.C.C.
243, where a drayman was required to work from 8 a. m.
to 9 p. m.; during that time he took no meals at home; he
left his team at the side of the street and crossed over to
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refresh himself at a pub with a glass of beer; he was there
about two minutes and on returning across the street was
killed by an automobile; Thomas v. Proctor & Gamble Mfg.
Co., 104 Kan. 432 [179 P. 372, 6 A.L.IL 1145), where an
employee was injured while at play during the noon hour.
The court refers to Campbell's Workmen's Compensation,
vol. 1, pp. 199-202, for a long list of situations where the
employee was allowed compensation whlle performing purely
personal acts. It refers to the cases from other states collected by Campbell which show a contrary rule but points
out that they are in states which have a doctrine of strict
construction of compensation acts, and that such doctrine
has never been adopted in this state. It then holds that
the theory of the cases which it approved, as well as the
one upon which it decided the case, is that the employee,
when injured, was engag·ed in doing something he might
reasonably have been expected to do while in the performance of his duty, or something which was reasonably contemplated by his employment. 'If the particular act is reasonably contemplated by the employment, injuries received
while performing it arise out of the employment, and are
compensable. In determining whether a particular act is
reasonably contemplated by the employment the nature of
the act, the nature of the employment, the custom and usage
of a particular emp]oyment, the terms of the contract of
employment, and perhaps other factors should be considered.
Any reasonable doubt as to whether the act is contemplated
by the employment, in view of this state's policy of liberal
construction in favor of the employee, should be resolved in
favor of the employee.' (Pp. 573, 574.)
"In Pacific Indem. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Corn., 26 Cal.2d
509 [159 P.2d 625], t-wo boys, 'rhomas and Adolfo, with
other members of their family, we:r;e employed as grape pickers on a piecework basis. After working all morning one
Saturday they quit at noon, as did all the other pickers. Accompanied by their sister and two friends, fellow workers,
they ·went by automobile to their home, some few miles distant from the camp supplied by the employer to most of
his employees, to pick up their work cards, which showed
their earnings for the week. They had been told that they
would get their pay at the office after 1 p. m. About 12:40
they stopped at an irrigation reservoir located on the employer's property to wash their hands, faces and feet, as
they were 'dirty.' They then intended to go to the office
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for their pay. Adolfo and one of the other boys had finished
their ablutions and were standing by the automobile, when
Thomas, then in the reservoir and unable to swim, called for
help. Adolfo and the other boy plunged into the reservoir
to rescue Thomas. They were unsuccessful. The other boy,
with the aid of a woman, managed to pull himself out, but
both Thomas and Adolfo were drowned. The reservoir was
used regularly for washing after work by all the grape pickers,
and many of them went swimming there. The commission
found that the deaths arose out of and occurred in the course
of their employment. The court upheld the finding of the
commission. The following excerpts from the opinion in that
case apply to our case : 'In considering the problem of the
compensable nature of the deaths in question, it must be
remembered that the reviewing court is not to determine
the weight to be given the evidence [citations] or which of
two opposing inferences should be drawn therefrom. [ Citations.] A review of the record in the light of these principles of law sustains the commission's findings and awards.'
(Pp. 512, 513.) 'Whether a given accident is so related
or incident to the work in which the employee is engaged
depends upon its own particular circumstances. No exact
formula can be laid down which will automatically solve
every case. [Citations.] The question is, of course, primarily one for the commission to determine.' (P. 516.) The
contention was made that there was no causal connection
between the employment and the death of Adolfo. He had
finished his ablutions and was standing by the automobile
when he heard his brother and coemployee Thomas cry for
help. Adolfo was drowned in the attempted rescue. The
court held that the death was of an industrial nature and
compensable. A somewhat similar situation occurred in
O'Leavy v. Brown-Pacific-Maxon, Inc., 340 U.S. 504 [71 S.Ct.
470, 95 L.Ed. 483], although in the latter case the death
occurred off the employer's premises. The employer was a
government contractor operating on the island of Guam. It
maintained for its employees a recreation center near the
shoreline, along which ran a channel so dangerous for swimmers that its use was forbidden, and signs to that effect
erected. John Valak, the employee, spent the afternoon at
the center and was waiting for his employer's bus to take
him from the area, when he heard two men, standing on the
reefs beyond the channel; signaling for help. Fo1lowed by
nearly twenty
he plunged in to effect a rescue, In
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attempting to swim the channel to reach the two men he
was drowned. On a claim filed by his dependent mother
under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (33 U.S.C. § 90l.et seq., 33 U.S.C.A. § 901 et seq.)
the commissioner found as a 'fact' that the death arose out
of and in the course of the employment. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed this finding, on the
ground that the lethal currents were not a part of the facilities supplied by the employer and that the attempted rescue
was neither for recreation nor was it in the course of the
employment. The Supreme Court, with a dissent by three
justices, reversed the decision of that court, and held that,
while the facts did not compel, they supported an inference that the death was fairly attributable to the risks of
the employment. It pointed out that an application of the
act which 'precluded an award for injuries incurred in an
attempt to rescue persons not known to be in the employer's
service, undertaken in forbidden waters outside the employer's premises . . . is too restricted an interpretation of the
Act. Workmen's compensation is not confined by common
law conceptions of scope of employment.' (P. 471 [71 S.
Ct.].) 'The test of recovery is not a causal relation between
the nature of employment of the injured person and the
accident. Thom v. Sinclair, (Eng.) [1917] A.C. 127, 142
[Ann. Cas. 1917D 188]. Nor is it necessary that the employee be engaged at the time of the injury in activity of
benefit to his employer. All that is required is that the
"obligations or conditions" of employment create the "zone·
of special danger" out of which the injury arose.' (Pp. 471,
472 [71 S.Ct.].) Applying to the facts of our case the
test as set forth in Em1ployers' etc. Corp. v. Industrial Ace.
CoYn., supm, 37 Cal.App.2d 567, and in the cases above
mentioned, raises an inference that the employment of this
young college stud10nt contemplated that in addition to his
pay, board and room, he was to use as an incident of that
employment the swimming facilities provided by the association for its employees, and which Swafford's employees
had the right to use. Actually, Glenn's right to use the pool
was by resaon of his distinct status as an employee and as
an incident of his employment. (See Pacific Indem. Co. v.
Ind1~strial Ace. Corn., supra, 26 Cal.2d 509, 515.)
"Petitioner contends that the fact that the place of injury
was off the employer's premises is controlling, quoting from
Makins v. Industrial Ace. Com., 198 Cal. 698 [247 P. 202,
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49 A.IJ.R. 411], and that for the same reason the so-called
'bunkhouse rule' does not apply. However, the place of injury is not the criterion. (See Associated Indem. C01·p. v.
Industrial Ace. Com., 18 Cal.2d 4Q [112 P.2d 615] .) It is,
whether the act of the employee when injured is reasonably contemplated by the employment.
''There are a number of jurisdictions where the rule of
strict interpretation of Workmen's Compensation· Acts prevails, the cases from which support petitioner's contentions.
But as that rule does not prevail in California, it is unnecessary to discuss them. Graf v. Montecito County Water Dist.,
1 Cal.2d 222 [34 P.2d 138], is easily distinguishable on the
facts from our case. 'l'here, the injured employees 'were
neither going to nor returning from their work, they lived
at the campsite and had been to their abodes, changed their
clothes and boarllerl the train [belonging to the employer]
for an excursion of pleasure wholly aside from their duties
as employees' (p. 22f.i). Moreover, the court stated that the
record failed to show the exact terms of the employment,
and there was no evidence that transportation was promised
the employees as a part of their contract, and hence nothing
in the record. to support the petitioner's contention that riding on the train was incidental to the employment. Moreover, the case was decirled in 1934. The dissenting opinion
of Shenk, J., to the effect that the train ride was incidental
to the employment more nearly represents the Supreme
Court's attitude today. Nor is Torrey v. Indu.strial Ace.
Com., 132 Cal.App. 303 [22 P.2c1 525], in point. There,
the employee went to a picnic ground to discuss business
with a coemployee. The latter invited him to go for a motorboat ride. 'rhe boat turned over and both men were drowned.
'rhe commission held. that the death did not occur in the
course of employment. The court upheld this determination, holding that the business of the employer was either
concluded, or postponed at the time of the boat ride and
that the evidence failed to show that the employee went on
the boat ride for any pnrpose other than his personal pleasure.
The court refers to the fact that adverse as well as favorable inferences may be drawn from the petitioner's evidence.
It may well have been that had the commission drawn an
inference to the effect that business was to be discussed during the five-minute boat ride, the court would have upheld
such action of the commission. In that case, differing from
ours, there was no finding that the interlude of pleasure
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was an incident of the employment. This same factor is
the distinction between our case and Langendorf United
Bakeries, Inc. v. Industrial Ace. Com., 6 Cal.App.2d 46 [43
P.2d 1106], Pacific Indem. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com., 27
Cal.App.2d 499 [81 P.2d 752], Red Arrow etc. Corp. v. Industrial Ace. Com., 39 Cal.App.2d 559 [103 P.2d 1004], and
others cited by petitioner.
"In Roberts v. llieans, 146 Pa.Super. 188 [22 A.2d 98],
a boy employed at a hotel to carry bags and rent boats on
the shore of a lake, was drowned while diving from a boat
which after his day's work and after his supper he had
rowed out on the lake. The court held that under the evidence he was using the boat solely for his own pleasure.
While the boy had been given permission by the employer
to swim from the wharf, if his employer was present, he
had been forbidden to go out in a boat under penalty of
losing his job. Obviously there is no similarity with the
facts in our case. The court also held that the boy's injury occurred off the employer's premises but pointed out
that this fact would not be conclusive had the appellant
met the burden of showing that the injury occurred in the
course of the employment.
"In State Young Men's C. As.sn. v. Industrial Com., 235
Wis. 161 [292 N.W. 324], Kregel, a medical student, was
employed as a counselor to assist the first aid medical director of a Y.M.C.A. summer camp. He was subject to call
on his free time, and hence he was usually within the camp
area. He was paid a salary and room and board. When
not actually occupied he was privileged to use the camp
recreational facilities including the tennis courts. While
engaged in a game of tennis with other counselors he was
struck in the eye by a tennis ball, causing the injury for
which he sought compensation. In reversing the lower court,
which had confirmed an award of the Wisconsin Industrial
Commission, the Supreme Court acted on the theory that
his play was purely voluntary on his part and was in nowise for the benefit of his employer. The theory of the
case is that 'there is no evidence that at the time the injury
was received the claimant was engaged in any work for his
employer.' (P. 326 [292 N.W.].) In California the right
to compensation by an employee is not limited to injuries
rereived vvhile actually engaging in the employer's work.
''The facts in Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Fulmer,
81 Ga.App. 97 [57 S.E.2d], cited by petitioner, are so dis-
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similar to those in our case as not to require comment. It,
Brynwood Land Co. v. Indttstrial Com., 243 Wis. 380 [10
N.W.2d 137], and Mishawaka, R1tbber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v.
Walker, 119 Ind.App. 309 [84 N.E.2d 897], applied the
well known rule that an injury sustained by an employee
while engaging in recreational activity for his own amusement is not compensable. None of them considers the situation where, as in our case, the place and type of recreation is provided by the employer as an incident of the employment.
"Petitioner cites Pacific Indem. Co. v. Industrial Ace.
Com., s1rpra, 27 Cal.App.2d 499, for the proposition that
'the mere fact of employment and permission to use the
premises of the employer does not give rise to a right to
compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act . . .
for an injury resulting to an employe.' (P. 503.) There,
the claimant was injured while attending a union meeting
in a room on the employer's premises, which the employer
had expressly agreed with the union committee might be
used for that purpose. In denying compensation, the court
points out that not only was the employee not engaging
in any business for her employer, but for aught that appears, the meeting may have been held for purposes antagonistic to her employer. There can be no quarrel with the
principle above mentioned. Our case, as herein shown, does
not depend upon that principle.''
''The award is affirmed.''
For the reasons above stated, I would affirm the award.

